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Abstract
Employing workers with Public Service Motivation (PSM) has
been proposed as a means of improving performance in the public sec-
tor. There is, however, no conclusive evidence showing PSM among
individuals. In this paper we attempt to ﬁrstly ﬁnd evidence of PSM
by investigating why people change jobs from the private to the public
sector. Secondly we attempt to identify factors that crowd out PSM
and thus hinder individuals with PSM from joining the public sector.
Keywords: Job satisfaction, Public Sector motivation.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D64, D82, J45, Z13
∗We wish to thank Jaideep Roy and seminar participants at Brunel University for
helpful comments.
†Department of Economics and Finance, Brunel University.
‡Department of Economics and Finance, Brunel University; DEI, University of Rome
Tor Vergata, CEDI and CMPO.
§Department of Economics and Finance, Brunel University.
11 Introduction
Hiring individuals with Public Service Motivation (PSM) is often proposed
as a way to improve public sector performance and to overcome incentive
problems in the public sector. In this paper we attempt to ﬁnd evidence of
PSM and to investigate whether extrinsic rewards crowd out PSM.
The concept of PSM has its roots in the public administration literature
where it is broadly deﬁned as “an individual’s predisposition to respond to
motives grounded primarily or uniquely in public institutions” (Perry, 1996).
This predisposition is determined by environmental factors, such as parental
modelling or socialization within organizations. It reﬂects three categories
of motives: rational, norm-based and aﬀective. Rational motives are present
when individuals want to participate in policy-making to pursue their polit-
ical agenda, or when individuals commit to a public program because they
personally identify with it. Norm-based motives are generated by a desire
to pursue the public interest; they include patriotism, civic duty and a sense
of loyalty to the government. Aﬀective motives refer to behaviour motivated
by emotional responses to diﬀerent social contexts and are characterized by
a desire to help others.
The presence of PSM generates a number of implications. If values and
sentiments associated with the public sector are attractive to individuals with
PSM, hiring these individuals will help to overcome incentive problems in the
public sector. Agents who care about the output will have less incentive to
shirk in the public sector than in the private sector.1 This is because public
sector managers cannot commit to increase other factors of production to
maintain output if an agent shirks eﬀort, whereas private sector managers
can, due to the proﬁt motive (Francois, 2001).2 Further, hiring individuals
with PSM will increase organizational eﬃciency in the public sector as better
1See Francois and Vlassopoulos (2007) for a survey on role of pro-social motivation in
overcoming incentive problems in the provision of public goods.
2Individuals are more willing to donate labour in the public sector because the public
sector can credibly commit not to expropriate labour (see Grout and Yong; 2003 and
Grout and Schnedler; 2006). Gregg, Grout, Ratcliﬀe, Smith and Windmeijer (2008) ﬁnd
that workers in the non-proﬁt sector donate signiﬁcantly more labour than workers in the
private sectors.
2matching of agents and principals with similar preferences reduces the need
for high-powered incentives (Besley and Ghatak, 2005). In fact the use of high
powered incentives may have adverse eﬀects on public-sector performance.
As shown by Benabou and Tirole (2006), monetary incentives decrease the
reputational value of pro-social actions and thus reduce the overall utility
from pro-social behaviour. Extrinsic rewards may then crowd out PSM:
whilst higher wages increase the probability of ﬁlling a job vacancy, they
decrease the expected average quality of job applicants because less motivated
workers are induced to apply (Delfgaauw and Dur; 2007).3
Conclusive empirical evidence of PSM amongst public-sector workers is
however yet to be found. Some empirical research into PSM is discussed in the
public administration literature: Brewer and Selden (1998) ﬁnd evidence of
PSM amongst whistle-blowers, but their sample comprises only public sector
employees, thus they do not compare public sector workers with workers
in other sectors. Crewson (1997) and Dilulio (1994) show that workers in
the public sector report higher satisfaction with the intrinsic characteristics
of work than workers in the private sector. These studies however do not
show whether it is the public sector that causes individuals to derive greater
satisfaction from the intrinsic characteristics of their work or rather it is
individuals who derive greater satisfaction from the intrinsic characteristics
of public-sector work who are drawn to the public sector.
Further, the empirical literature on the crowding-out eﬀect of monetary
incentives has not considered the eﬀect of extrinsic rewards on public sec-
tor workers.4 Frey, Oberholzer-Gee, and Eichenberger (1996) and Frey and
Oberholzer-Gee (1997) show that people are less likely to accept that “Not
In My Backyard” (NIMBY) projects are undertaken in their own town when
they are oﬀered a monetary compensation. In an experimental study, Gneezy
and Rustichini (2000a) show that individuals exert less eﬀort when a small
monetary compensation is oﬀered than when no compensation is oﬀered. In
Gneezy and Rustichini (2000b) the introduction of a ﬁne to parents who
3Crowding out of workers with PSM has also been attributed to unmotivated workers
being attracted to the public sector (see Delfgaauw and Dur; 2008).
4In his seminal paper, Titmuss (1970) argued that monetary compensation undermines
civic duty so that the introduction of monetary compensation would result in blood of
lower quality being collected.
3are late in collecting their children from school increases the rate of parents
arriving late.5
In this paper, we use data from the British Household Panel Survey
(BHPS) to investigate whether PSM can explain individuals’ propensity to
move into public sector jobs. To proxy the utility derived from extrinsic
aspects of the job we use workers’ self-reported satisfaction with pay, satis-
faction with job security and satisfaction with working hours. We consider
satisfaction with work itself as a proxy for intrinsic rewards.6 Using predicted
diﬀerentials for these variables, we estimate transition probabilities from the
private into the public sector.
Our results show that the higher the predicted satisfaction with the work
itself in the public sector, the higher the probability that an individual will
make the transition from the private to the public sector. Instead, higher
predicted satisfaction with the extrinsic characteristics does not raise the
probability of transition. These results imply that individuals are drawn to
the public sector by the intrinsic characteristics of working in the public sec-
tor rather than the extrinsic beneﬁts, which is consistent with the existence
of PSM evidence. Further, extrinsic rewards crowd out PSM, in that, higher
predicted satisfaction diﬀerentials with the extrinsic characteristics of the
job (i.e. satisfaction with hours of work, satisfaction with job security, and
satisfaction with pay) decrease the likelihood of individuals moving into the
public sector. We ﬁnd similar results by investigating transitions into dif-
ferent occupational classiﬁcations and into diﬀerent sub-sectors of the public
sector.
The paper also oﬀers some of the ﬁrst evidence on public sector rents
based on domain satisfaction measures, thus contributing to a growing lit-
erature on public sector rents using subjective well-being measures (see e.g.
Luechinger, Meier, and Stutzer, 2005; Clark and Senik, 2005; and Clark.
5See Frey and Jegen (2001) for a survey of the literature on crowding out and in of
intrinsic motivation.
6The use of self-reported satisfaction data has been validated by several researchers.
For example, it has been shown that job satisfaction predicts future quits (Freeman, 1978;
Clark et al. 1998), it is negatively correlated with absenteeism (Clegg, 1983) and that it
is positively correlated with productivity (Mangione and Quinn, 1975). See Diener (2000)
for a review.
42004). Earlier studies on public sector rents focused mainly on wage diﬀer-
entials (see e.g. Bender 1998).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the
theoretical foundation of our empirical analysis and it derives the predictions.
Section 3 discusses the empirical methodology whilst section 4 presents the
empirical results. Section 5 concludes with some policy recommendations.
2 Theoretical Foundations
We draw from Benabou and Tirole (2006) (hereafter BT) for the simple
theoretical framework.7 We consider the behavior of agents who choose to
move from the private to the public sector. ak denotes the level of pro-social
activities undertaken by each agent in sector k at cost ck and yk denotes
the (vector of) extrinsic rewards (such as, higher wages, greater job security
and better working hours) enjoyed by agents working in sector k. k = P,G,
where k = P denotes the private sector and k = G denotes the public sector.
More pro-social activities are carried out in the public sector; for simplicity
and without loss of generality we let aG =1and aP =0 . The sector in which
an agent works, the sectorial level of pro-social activities ak and the extrinsic
rewards yk are publicly observable.
Agents diﬀer in their intrinsic valuation for prosocial activities and in their
valuation for extrinsic rewards. These valuations are perfectly negatively
correlated.8 A na g e n t ’ st y p ei st h e nd e ﬁned by the intrinsic value ωi ∈ [0,ω]
that he attaches to carrying out 1 unit of pro-social activities; ω − ωi is the
value he attaches to 1 unit of extrinsic rewards. ωi is a random variable
with density function f(ωi).A g e n t sh a v er e p u t a t i o n a lc o n c e r n sa n dw i s ht o
appear pro-social/altruistic. The value of reputation depends linearly on the
posterior belief E(ωi|k,yk) of the agent’s type ωi, given sector k in which the
agent works and the extrinsic rewards yk he enjoys. The utility of agent i
7See also Benabou and Tirole (2003).
8This is for simplicity. The model can easily be extended to cover the general case
discussed in BT.
5from working in sector k is
Ui,k =( ωi − ck)ak +( ω − ωi)yk + μEk(ωi|k,yk),
where μ ∈ [0,1] is the weight on reputational concerns.
There are two periods. In period 1 nature draws the agent type that
is unobservable; agents then randomly choose between the private and the
public sector. In period 2, agents privately observe ωi and choose whether
to remain in the sector they are in, or to move to the other sector. Let
ˆ y ≡ yG − yP > 0, then the agents who by the end of period 2 will be in the
public sector are those for whom Ui,G ≥ Ui,P,t h a ti sw i t h
ωi ≥ ˜ ωi ≡
cG − ˆ y − μR
1 − ˆ y
, (1)
where
R ≡ E(ωi|G,yG) − E(ωi|P,yP), (2)
denotes the reputational gain from working in the public sector. Half of the
agents with high intrinsic motivation, ωi ≥ ˜ ωi, will thus be moving from the
private to the public sector.
The posterior belief at the end of period 2 of the level of pro-social mo-
tivation of an agent in the public sector is
E(ωi|G,yG)=
R ω
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˜ ωi f(ωi)dωi is the fraction ρ of agents who will work in the public
sector by the end of period 2. As ˆ y increases, more agents with low pro-
social motivation ωi are attracted to the public sector and the ‘honour’ of
working in the public sector decreases. The posterior belief about the level
of pro-social motivation of an agent in the private sector is
EP(ωi|P,yP)=
R ˜ ωi(ˆ y)
0 ωif(ωi)dωi
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2
∂˜ ωi (ˆ y)
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> 0.
6As ˆ y increases, more agents with low pro-social motivation are attracted
to the public sector and the stigma of working in the private sector decreases.9
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This is the “imagine spoiling eﬀect of rewards” emphasized by BT: higher
extrinsic rewards reduce the reputational gain R from joining the public
sector. It follows that
d˜ ωi (ˆ y)
dˆ yi
=








Higher extrinsic rewards in the public sector generate two opposite eﬀects.
On the one hand, they increase transition to the public sector by attracting
agents who wish to enjoy these higher rewards; on the other hand they reduce
transition by lowering the reputational gain R from joining the public sector.
When the weight μ on reputational concerns is suﬃciently high, extrinsic
rewards crowd out intrinsic motivation.
3 Methodology and Data
We use data from the ﬁrst fourteen waves of the British Household Panel
Survey (BHPS) covering the period 1991-2004. The BHPS is a longitudinal
survey of approximately 10,000 individuals in 5,500 households per year,
providing a rich source of information of demographic and labour market
characteristics, as well as information on individuals’ subjective evaluation
of their jobs and their economic situation. Restricting the sample to full-
time workers between the ages of 16 and 65 results in 37384 and 25728
person-year observations for men and women respectively. Crucially, the
9Note that, because of the reputational eﬀect, the (marginal) ”total” value of extrinsic












7panel nature of the data allows us to identify, during the sample period, 747
transitions from the private to the public sector, all initiated by the workers
themselves voluntarily (i.e. quits), with no intervening unemployment or
inactivity spells.
In order to explore whether such transitions are driven or explained by
PSM, we classify job attributes observed prior to and after each transition as
intrinsic or as extrinsic. To make such a distinction operational, we consider
w a g e s ,j o bt e n u r ea n dh o u r so fw o r kt ob ee x t r i n s i cr e w a r d s ,w h i l et h en a t u r e
of the work itself to be an intrinsic reward. We take the view that individuals
have a predetermined level of PSM, which is the result of environmental
factors, such as parental modelling and socialization within social groups
that individuals interact with or are part of. Because it is diﬃcult to measure
individuals’ motives directly, we proxy such motives by using self-reported
domain job satisfaction scores. Following the theoretical model in Section
2, we expect that satisfaction with intrinsic rewards is positively correlated
with the probability of transition into the public sector. In contrast, due to
reputational eﬀects, satisfaction with extrinsic rewards should have little or
even negative inﬂuence on individuals’ decision to seek employment in the
public sector.
More formally, the probability that individual i makes the transition into
the public sector can be written as
Pr(M
G
it =1 )=P r [ β
0X
P
i,t−1 + εit > 0] (5)
In (5), MG
it is an observed indicator variable taking the value 1 if an
individual i moves into the public sector at time t and 0 otherwise. The
vector XP
i,t−1 represents individual and labour market characteristics at time
t − 1, the year prior to making the transition. It includes expected earnings
diﬀerentials between the public and the private sector as well as expected
satisfaction diﬀerentials for the various extrinsic and intrinsic job attributes
under consideration.10 εit is a random error term.
Earnings in both private and public sector employment are observed only
10These are the ωi (aG − aP) and (1 − ωi)(yG − yP) and ωi (aG − aP) in the theoretical
model.
8for those in private employment and public employment respectively, and
they are censored at zero. Because of this, we estimate standard Mincer-type
earnings functions corrected for selectivity bias. We use these estimates to
calculate the expected earnings diﬀerential between the public and private
sector ˆ yit for each individual in our sample, irrespective of current status.
These expected earnings diﬀerentials are used when estimating equation (5),
the transition into the public sector equation. In a similar fashion, we es-
timate diﬀerentials for satisfaction with pay ˆ sit(PAY) = ˆ SG
it(PAY) − ˆ SP
it(PAY),
satisfaction with job security ˆ sit(SEC) = ˆ SG
it(SEC) − ˆ SP
it(SEC), satisfaction with
hours worked ˆ sit(HOURS) = ˆ SG
it(HOURS)− ˆ SP
it(HOURS), and satisfaction with the
work itself (an intrinsic reward) ˆ sit(WORK) = ˆ SG
it(WORK) − ˆ SP
it(WORK) between
the public and private sectors. These predicted domain satisfaction diﬀer-









The main hypothesis that PSM increases the probability of transition
into the public sector implies a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient α5.I fe x -
trinsic rewards exert little or no inﬂuence on individuals’ decision to become
public sector employees, then the coeﬃcients α1 to α4 will be statistically
insigniﬁcant. Negative and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients α1 to α4 are
consistent with the crowding out hypothesis, whereby extrinsic rewards mit-
igate an individual’s utility from the intrinsic rewards associated with the
transition into the public sector.
4R e s u l t s
We begin by presenting summary statistics for the real wage, job and the
four domains of job satisfaction.
[Insert Table 1 here.]
9The table above shows that on average wages are signiﬁcantly higher
in the public sector than in the private sector, for both men and women.
Satisfaction with pay is also higher in the public sector than in the private
sector. We ﬁnd similar results with the number of hours worked and job
tenure: on average people work fewer hours and stay in jobs longer in the
public sector.11 In addition, our results show that individuals in the public
sector are more satisﬁed with job security and with the number of hours
they work than individuals in the private sector. Average satisfaction with
t h ew o r ki t s e l fi ss i g n i ﬁcantly higher in the public sector than in the private
sector.
We now examine the results that make use of observed transition into the
public sector. Table 2 below gives the probit estimations for transition from
the private to the public sector.
[Insert Table 2 here]
There is strong evidence for our main hypothesis: people are more likely
to move to public sector if they expect to enjoy greater satisfaction with
the work itself in the public sector. Further, higher predicted satisfaction
with pay in the public sector will reduce the probability of moving to the
public sector, thus providing evidence of the image spoiling eﬀect of monetary
rewards in the public sector. The satisfaction with job security diﬀerential is
insigniﬁcant. This provides evidence that individuals are not more likely to
join the public service out of a desire to derive greater utility from job security.
There is strong evidence that higher (predicted) utility with the number
of hours worked in the public sector reduces an individual’s probability of
joining the public sector. Thus, the results of the predicted satisfaction with
pay and working hours diﬀerentials are consistent with the crowding out
hypothesis, whereby extrinsic rewards mitigate an individual’s utility from
the intrinsic rewards associated with the transition into the public sector.
This grouping of results shows that people join the public sector mainly
because it oﬀers individuals with PSM the opportunity to carry out pro-
social activities. Higher wages or better extrinsic rewards are not the driving
11This is consistent with previous studies. See e.g. Rama (1999) and Bender (1998)
10force behind the transition. In fact, our results show that higher extrinsic
rewards in the public sector crowd out PSM in the public service, i.e. make it
less likely for individuals who are public service motivated to join the public
sector.
We now examine transition into diﬀerent occupational groupings in the
public sector at the one digit (or Major Group) level using the Standard
Occupational Classiﬁcation 1990 (SOC 1990). The major group is a grouping
of broad occupational categories which is useful in comparing occupations
that have similar qualiﬁcations, training, skills, and experience. Table 3
gives the results.
[Insert Table 3 here]
Once more we ﬁnd strong evidence for our main hypothesis, the predicted
satisfaction with work itself diﬀerential signiﬁcantly increases the probability
of making the transition to the public sector. This shows that individuals
with high levels of PSM are more likely to move to the public sector. There
is also evidence of PSM being crowded out by extrinsic rewards. For most
occupations, either the predicted satisfaction with pay or satisfaction with
working hours are negative and signiﬁcant. Exceptions are individuals mov-
ing into management and administration or are becoming plant and machine
operatives in the public sector. In both these types of occupation we ﬁnd
no evidence to support the hypothesis that higher satisfaction with the work
itself in the public sector increases the likelihood of moving to the public
sector as the predicted satisfaction with work diﬀerential is insigniﬁcant.
Next, we divide the public sector into diﬀerent sub-sectors, these being
central government, local government and public corporations. There are im-
portant diﬀerences in these organizational structures that may impact how
attractive these sub-sectors are to individuals with PSM. These diﬀerences
for example manifest themselves in some sub-sectors providing less oppor-
tunity for individuals with PSM to carry out their motivations. Central
governments and public sector corporations are more likely to succumb to
pressure from unions and employees than local government. Wages and other
pecuniary and non pecuniary beneﬁts have been shown to be higher in cen-
11tral government and public sector corporations. We expect higher wages and
non pecuniary beneﬁts to reduce the likelihood of a public sector motivated
individual moving into these sub-sectors of the public sector. Table 4 be-
low gives the results for probit estimations for transition probability into the
diﬀerent sub-sectors.
[Insert Table 4 here]
The results show that the probability of transition into all sub-sectors is
signiﬁcantly positively related to the satisfaction diﬀerential with work it-
self. However, the probability of transition is signiﬁcantly reduced by the
predicted satisfaction with pay diﬀerential for both transition into central
government and the NHS and Higher Education. The probability of transi-
tion is also signiﬁcantly reduced by the predicted satisfaction with working
hours diﬀerential for transition into the NHS and Higher Education. This
implies that the higher predicted satisfaction with wages and better working
hours, enjoyed in central government and public sector corporations, reduces
the utility of moving into these sub-sectors for individuals.12 Grouped to-
gether, the results show that individuals are more likely to move into these
diﬀerent sub-sectors of government if they are public service motivated.
5 Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
Our results show that higher wages, satisfaction with pay, job security and
working hours in the public sector are either insigniﬁcant in inﬂuencing the
probability of transition to the public sector or reduce this probability. In-
stead, higher satisfaction with the intrinsic characteristics of work in the
public sector increases the probability of transition to the public sector. In-
dividuals are more likely to move due to higher satisfaction with the work
itself in the public sector, as the public sector provides greater opportunity
12The wage diﬀerential being signiﬁcant and positive for women moving into local gov-
ernment can be partially explained by the fact the wage diﬀerential between the private
and public sector is greatest for women.
12for these individuals to carry out their public service motivation. This group-
i n go fr e s u l t sp r o v i d e ss t r o n ge v i d e n c e of PSM and suggests that extrinsic
rewards may crowd out intrinsic motivation.
These results suggest that from an eﬃciency point of view, the public
sector should lower wages and other extrinsic rewards for two reasons. Firstly,
high wages in the public sector deter individuals with PSM from entering the
public sector as high wages decrease their utility from this pro-social move
because they are perceived to be “greedy”. Therefore lower wages and other
extrinsic rewards allow for better matching as individuals with PSM will be
more willing to work in the public sector. Secondly, a reduction in wages and
other extrinsic rewards will reduce problems of adverse selection in hiring
new workers for the public sector. High wages in the public sector will also
attract individuals who do not have PSM. These individuals require higher
powered incentives to perform the same task compared to individuals with
high levels of PSM and therefore are more costly than individuals with PSM.
By oﬀering lower wages the public sector will attract a higher proportion of
individuals with PSM.
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All  1647 (16627)  1501 (43650)  1541 (60277)  15.40*** 
Women  1497 (9663)  1137 (15241)  1277 (24904)  33.55*** 
Men  1855 (6964)  1696 (28409)  1727 (35373)  10.55*** 
Hours Worked 
All  37.04 (17402)  39.44 (46533)  38.78 
(63935) 
-41.20*** 
Women  35.83 (10126)  37.09 (16127)  36.60 
(26253) 
-17.79*** 




All  5.59 (16770)  4.17 (44143)  4.56 (60913)  25.44*** 
Women  4.99 (9796)  3.45 (15556)  4.04 (25352)  22.02*** 
Men  6.42 (6974)  4.56 (28587)  4.93 (35561)  21.25*** 
Satisfaction with Pay 
All  4.75 (16621)  4.73 (43608)  4.73 (60229)  1.30* 
Women  4.83 (9657)  4.75 (15226)  4.78 (24883)  4.00*** 
Men  4.63 (6964)  4.72 (28382)  4.70 (35346)  -4.23*** 
Satisfaction with Job Security 
All  5.45 (16606)  5.27 (43520)  5.32 (60126)  12.64*** 
Women  5.55 (9649)  5.42 (15194)  5.47 (24843)  6.54*** 
Men  5.31 (6957)  5.19 (28326)  5.21 (35283)  5.77*** 
Satisfaction with the work itself 
All  5.48 (16621)  5.38 (43618)  5.41 (60239)  7.75*** 
Women  5.55 (9659)  5.43 (15234)  5.48 (24893)  6.67*** 
Men  5.39 (6962)  5.36 (28384)  5.36 (35346)  1.45* 
Satisfaction with hours worked 
All  5.15 (16620)  5.05 (43625)  5.08 (60245)  8.15*** 
Women  5.14 (9659)  5.18 (15233)  5.17 (24892)  -2.06** 
Men  5.17 (6961)  4.97 (28392)  5.01 (35353)  10.01*** 
The number of observations are given in brackets (). *** indicates significance at a 1% confidence 
level, ** indicates significance at a 5% confidence level, and * indicates significance at a 10% 





 Table 2. Probit results for transition from Private to Public Sector 
Dependent Variable: Transition to Public Sector  
  All (Full-time)  Men (Full-time) Women  (Full-time) 
      
it y ˆ   -0.700 (0.252)  -0.597 (0.506)  -1.285 (0.127) 
) ( ˆ PAY it s   -0.309* (0.051)  -0.188** (0.411)  -0.337 (0.137) 
) ( ˆ SEC it s   0.163 (0.249)  0.248 (0.244)  0.038 (0.844) 
) ( ˆ WORK it s   1.320*** (0.000)  1.564*** (0.000)  1.235*** (0.001) 




0.486*** (0.000)  0.371** (0.046)  0.539*** (0.004) 
Age  -0.001 (0.832)  0.002 (0.625)  0.001 (0.786) 
Pension (t-1)  -0.259*** (0.000)  -0.222*** (0.000)  -0.279*** (0.000) 
      
Trade Union 
Member 
0.107** (0.041)  -0.020 (0.789)  0.279*** (0.000) 
Married  -0.163** (0.010)  -0.214** (0.021)  -0.189** (0.032) 
Living as 
Couple 
-0.052 (0.413)  -0.094 (0.322)  -0.083 (0.349) 
Widowed  -0.473* (0.059)  -0.507 (0.204)  -0.668** (0.041) 
Divorced  0.191** (0.050)  0.228 (0.126)  0.031 (0.815) 
Higher 
Level Edu 
-0.074 (0.245)  -0.197** (0.024)  0.128 (0.191) 
Medium 
Level Edu 
0.031 (0.570)  0.003 (0.973)  0.065 (0.443) 
Health 
Problems 
0.027 (0.729)  0.005 (0.964)  0.051 (0.663) 
      
No. of 
Children 
0.040 (0.106)  0.053 (0.111)  0.091** (0.019) 
Renter  0.189*** (0.000)  0.232*** (0.002)  0.139* (0.088) 
Medium 
Firm 
-0.085* (0.070)  -0.076 (0.261)  -0.073 (0.279) 
Large Firm  -0.166*** (0.001)  -0.056 (0.446)  -0.254*** (0.001) 
Regional 
Dummies 
Yes Yes  Yes 
      
Constant  -3.590*** (0.000)  -3.906*** (0.000)  -3.368*** (0.000) 
Observations  35861 23460  12401 
Pseudo R
2  0.074 0.070  0.104 
The p values are given in brackets (). *** indicates significance at a 1% confidence level, ** indicates 








 Table 3. Probit results for transition from Private to Public Sector into jobs grouped 
according to the Standard Occupational Classification (1990) (Major Groups)  
Dependent Variable: Transition to Public Sector Occupation  
  All (Full-time)      Men (Full-time) Women  (Full-time) 
      
      
  Group 1  Group 2  Group 3 
it y ˆ   -3.397* (0.058)  -0.325 (0.816)  -0.676 (0.594) 
) ( ˆ PAY it s   0.082 (0.876)  -0.038 (0.919)  -0.291 (0.379) 
) ( ˆ SEC it s   -0.444 (0.312)  0.121 (0.712)  0.416 (0.139) 
) ( ˆ WORK it s   0.177 (0.827)  1.000* (0.097)  1.281** (0.012) 
) ( ˆ HOURS it s   -1.824*** (0.008)  -1.107** (0.041)  -1.022** (0.030) 
Transitions  50 101  120 
Observations  24816 35152  35861 
      
  Group 4  Group 6  Group 8 
it y ˆ   -0.264 (0.804)  -0.311 (0.792)  0.587 (0.766) 
) ( ˆ PAY it s   -0.807*** (0.003)  -0.047 (0.880)  -0.153 (0.776) 
) ( ˆ SEC it s   0.127 (0.604)  0.005 (0.984)  0.041 (0.934) 
) ( ˆ WORK it s   1.101** (0.013)  0.912* (0.064)  0.458 (0.588) 
) ( ˆ HOURS it s   -0.972** (0.021)  -0.796* (0.072)  -0.414 (0.610) 
Transitions  169 140  37 
Observations  35861 35861  27298 
      
  Group 9    
it y ˆ   -1.346 (0.366)     
) ( ˆ PAY it s   0.292 (0.440)     
) ( ˆ SEC it s   0.140 (0.689)     
) ( ˆ WORK it s   1.708*** (0.005)     
) ( ˆ HOURS it s   -0.477 (-0.418)     
Transitions  90    
Observations  34366    
      
The p values are given in brackets (). *** indicates significance at a 1% confidence level, ** indicates 
significance at a 5% confidence level, and * indicates significance at a 10% confidence level. Group 1 
(Managers and Administrators), Group 2 (Professional Occupations), Group 3 (Associate Professional 
and Technical Occupations), Group 4 (Clerical and Secretarial Occupations), Group 6 (Personal and 








Table 4. Probit results for transition into jobs in Central and Local Government, and 
the NHS or Higher with satisfaction Domains. 
  All (Full-time)      Men (Full-time) Women  (Full-time) 
Transition into Central Government 
it y ˆ   -0.429 (0.698)  0.266 (0.870)  -0.937 (0.552) 
) ( ˆ PAY it s   -0.372 (0.210)  -0.131 (0.749)  -0.672 (0.133) 
) ( ˆ SEC it s   0.270 (0.295)  0.360 (0.336)  0.213 (0.554) 
) ( ˆ WORK it s   1.182** (0.015)  1.090 (0.122)  1.394** (0.050) 
) ( ˆ HOURS it s   -0.772* (0.069)  -0.242 (0.695)  -1.353** (0.023) 
Transitions  141 77  64 
Observations  35636 21992  11898 
      
Transition into Local Government 
it y ˆ   -0.679 (0.448)  -0.863 (0.508)  -0.843 (0.498) 
) ( ˆ PAY it s   0.384 (0.105)  0.193 (0.572)  0.674** (0.050) 
) ( ˆ SEC it s   -0.239 (0.258)  -0.039 (0.899)  -0.511* (0.084) 
) ( ˆ WORK it s   1.301*** (0.001)  1.514*** (0.005)  1.314** (0.013) 
) ( ˆ HOURS it s   -0.879** (0.012)  -0.793 (0.118)  -1.111** (0.023) 
Transitions  275 119  156 
Observations  35636 23018  12273 
      
Transition into NHS or Higher Education 
it y ˆ   -0.953 (0.325)  -2.181 (0.236)  -1.447 (0.224) 
) ( ˆ PAY it s   -0.897*** (0.000)  -0.393 (0.371)  -0.970*** (0.002) 
) ( ˆ SEC it s   0.341 (0.114)  0.097 (0.821)  0.373 (0.153) 
) ( ˆ WORK it s   0.773** (0.050)  1.286* (0.088)  0.791 (0.103) 
) ( ˆ HOURS it s   -1.204*** (0.001)  -1.605** (0.022)  -1.270*** (0.005) 
Transitions  228 59  169 
Observations  35861 21604  12401 
      
The p values are given in brackets (). *** indicates significance at a 1% confidence level, ** indicates 
significance at a 5% confidence level, and * indicates significance at a 10% confidence level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 